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Power supply infrastructures are facing radical changes. The introduction of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies (ICT) into power grids will allow to automatically monitor and control the power
demand and supply. This concept is generally referred to as Smart Grid, and is expected to exponentially
grow during the coming years. However, ICT systems are increasingly subject to security cyber attacks,
which can have a disruptive impact on the whole power grid, and put people’s safety and business interests
at risk. This report covers background information on the smart grid with focus on smart metering in par-
ticular. Important aspects such as security and life-cycle management are covered. In addition, the typical
smart grid components and communication protocols are surveyed.
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1. Introduction
Historically, power grids have been composed of few large components with the main function to distribute
power and dispatch control commands in a single direction, namely towards end devices. That is, this
classical grid is in general asymmetric in terms of communication. Some components can provide control
functionalities, but this is usually limited to the core of the grid, and not implemented on a single component
basis. The need for monitoring the grid has emerged quite fast, as gathering information is important to
maintain stability and safety. In fact, a power grid can be sensitive to fluctuations in power loads, and it is
possibly for localized faults to easily escalate and spread quickly, so causing wider and more severe effects.
Therefore, it is vital to promptly address unpredicted circumstances, issues and maintenance needs. This
is the reason why adding intelligence and monitoring capability to power grids has been a gradual but fast
process, which could massively benefit from the rapid development in IT areas.
Smart grid is a class of technology that modernizes electricity delivery systems by using computer-
based remote control and automation [45]. In particular, the introduction of Information and Communica-
tion Technologies (ICT) into power grids allows automatic monitoring and control of the power demand
and supply. Practically, a smart grid relies on remotely controlled actuators and switches for controlling
the grid, and sensors and meters that continuously monitor the current power flow and other important
statistics. Getting such accurate information results in a number of benefits. They include ensuring quick
reactions in case of faults or malfunctioning, automatically detecting and locating faults to promptly dis-
patch repair teams, performing load-balancing of the network and implementing pro-active strategies to
maintain the stability of the grid.
A smart meter is a particularly important component in smart grids, and is supposed to be deployed
especially in individual customers’ homes. In particular, such devices allow the collection of accurate
power metering data from all customers of a given energy operator. In addition, the energy operator can
remotely send commands to smart meters in order to trigger different actions on the customers’ side. For
instance, it can be asked to reduce the current power usage or to interact with private home appliances, e.g.
to selectively control them. At the same time, there are also a number of benefits for the customer. For
instance, he can be informed about preferable consumption patterns, which would result in reducing the
energy bill. Furthermore, it becomes easier to manage private production of power, such as through solar
cells, and sell it to the energy operator. Finally, providing customers with accurate statistics about their
own power usage can further help to reduce power consumption and related costs.
Security is particularly important in a smart grid architecture. Since ICT systems are increasingly
subject to security attacks, smart grids inevitably inherit a number of security threats and vulnerabilities,
at the network, application and platform level. Besides, possible unauthorized physical accesses to smart
grid components may allow retrieval of sensitive data and security material. Even the final customer can
be motivated to tamper with the smart meter at his own private residence, in order to defraud the billing
process. In general, a successful attack against a smart power grid can result in severe, possibly large
scale, consequences. For instance, gaining access to the control system components makes it possible to
increase the power load on certain parts of the grid, or damaging transformer stations. This is only one of
many possible attacks, whose effects on society can be devastating in terms of people’s safety and business
interests. Loss of power in an area can affect hospitals, impact on food storage facilities and services,
and cause countless secondary accidents due to the lack of power. A single software bug, along with other
concurring factors, caused overloading in several parts of the network and created a large blackout affecting
up to 55 million people in the northeast United States during 2003 [44].
This document overviews important components and security aspects related to smart grids, with par-
ticular focus on the smart metering process and smart meter devices. The goal is to give a broad picture of
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the current state of the art with reference to different relevant areas. Currently, there are several documents
focusing on single aspects such as communication protocols or management of cryptographic material.
Instead, it is more difficult to find a single resource that gives a more complete picture of multiple security
issues related to smart grids and smart metering.
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the smart grid
concept. This includes the historical development of power grids, the emergence of smart grids and what
benefits they provide. Chapter 3 covers platform security for smart meters. Relevant topics on this area
are hardware, software and virtualization solutions. Chapter 4 discusses life-cycle management in smart
grids. Key management and initial provisioning of keys are two particular aspects covered. Chapter 5
presents different communications protocols that are commonly used in smart grids. Since the grid can
be separated into different communications levels, there are also protocols that are suitable for each level.
For instance, communication between smart meters and home appliances relies on some communications
protocols, while different ones are used in other portions of the grid. Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on security
in smart grids, and overviews some threats and possible solutions.
3
2. Overview and Background
This chapter describes the background and historical development of the power grid and smart grid. The
first section goes through some of the history of the traditional power grid and how it has developed.
This includes the structure of the classical power grid and how the monitoring came to be needed. It also
mentions some of the historical development and improvements to the power grid. The second section
considers the improvements that the smart grid provides. Both customer and producer can benefit in a
number of ways from the functionality the smart grid provides. The same section also considers why
security is an important challenge for smart grids and why an attack against the power grid can have
significant negative effects.
Traditional power grids are yesterday typically composed of a few but large power stations connected
with high-capacity transport lines that distribute the power and connect local substations with consumers
[38]. Typically the process is uni-directional and focuses on providing power from the generator sites to
the individual consumers. Of course, due to the nature of electricity, there is some feedback in the system
but in general the communication and flow of energy or data is asymmetric. There can also be other
complications, such as different electrical systems interacting with each other, for instance the frequency
or other characteristics of the power can differ between geographic or legally defined areas. Even from the
early days of the power grid, limitations in how electricity can be transmitted forced a configuration with
many local sites that served av limited area. Because of difficulties with power transmission power often
had to be generated close to where it was consumed. Taking care of all these aspects and creating national
and even international power grids took a lot of planning and effort.
Technological developments like the invention and use of AC power also simplified some of the early
problems related to power distribution. By standardizing the adopted technologies and configurations larger
scaled systems could be created. Efficiently transferring power between different regions is needed since
a localized shortage can occur or, as often is the case, the power distribution and power usage areas are
far apart. Countries can also trade power with each other as any other resources are bought and sold on
international markets. There are ways to share power even between countries that do not share the same
power system characteristics such as first converting it to DC.
2.1 Power grid enhancements
It was also recognized early that there is a need to monitor and collect information about the state of the
power grid. Readings of power information through telegraph lines started as early as the end of the 19th
century [38]. In the 20th century the power lines themselves could be used to transmit data and information
about the grid itself. One issue is that upgrading or changing the existing power infrastructure would result
in a large costs. For instance, if a stretch of power lines should be upgraded with better communication
or monitoring capabilities, this can be a very costly endeavor, especially if it has to be done for the entire
power grid. Another issues is that these upgrades may have to be frequent while the desire is that the power
grid, like water pipes or other fixed infrastructure, should be possible to erect and then utilize for a long
period of time. A time scale that is longer than the fast pace of technological development which means
retro-fitting old power lines with new systems is not always feasible or has to be done slowly due to cost.
For instance power cables can be buried and adding sensors or cables for data communication in those
circumstances is expensive. Because of this, techniques that utilize the current infrastructure like power-
line communication are useful. Power-line communication can encode data and transmit it via the power
lines, so if two sections of the grid are already connected through power lines they can also exchange data
via power-line communication. In fact it can serve as a stepping stone between the old electrical grid and
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the modern smart grid that instead require more dedicated communication channels.
Including monitoring and control capabilities in the power grid would result in several advantages. One
of these is the possibility of more easily maintaining stability in the power grid. Another benefit is detection
of, and possibly automatic detection against, damage to the grid such as cable failures. Generation of power,
especially from low-voltage small-scale installation such as solar panels, is also simplified as the exact input
of these can be measured and utilized by the grid as needed. Detecting anomalous current flow and quickly
shutting down broken or malfunctioning links can prevent damage to people or the power system itself.
More advanced systems can monitor the incoming voltage to a line and compare it to the outgoing, any
major differences compared to expected behaviour indicates an issue. One advantage of computerized
monitoring is that the systems can be automated to repair problems on their own. In this way, the reaction
time to solve issues can be considerably reduced compared to requiring human intervention every time
something goes wrong. The key to implementing a system like this is to have comprehensive information
on the power grid and proper communication that can relay this information and commands to a control
system.
Another advantage would consist of better supervision and control of power generation. Ensuring that
a generator is producing power that is in-sync, with the correct voltage and amount to the rest of the grid
can also be automated. For instance the speed which the generator is spinning or how much power is fed
through it can be automatically controlled. Interactions between components in the power system such as
generators can cause instability and fluctuations that spread and create issues throughout the grid. Sensors
can detect oscillations and anomalies in the power flow and attempts can be made to correct them by issuing
control commands taking into account available sensor data accordingly. An automated system can often
act quicker and with more accuracy than human operators supervising every small adjustment.
2.2 Towards smart grids
Most recently, the smart grid concept has been introduced to refer to a system where intelligent and au-
tonomous control is implemented in individual pieces of a power grid. A brief list of common components
in a smart grid are the following:
• Smart meter - Device that allows two way communication for remote management and reporting
statistics.
• Data concentrator - Device in the grid that gathers and relays information from the smart meters.
• Head end system - Central system in which smart metering data relayed from the concentrators is
received.
• Appliance - Device in a home that is in communication with the smart meter. For instance toaster,
refrigerator, heating systems.
Figure 2.1 presents a basic high-level view of the smart grid.
Two factors are important for the functionality of the smart grid, the first one is sensing and information
gathering, in other words carefully monitoring the status of the network. To be able to intelligently control
the smart grid up to date information and status information on the grid is needed. For this purpose sensors
and other monitoring equipment must be installed in the grid. Devices that were previously ”dumb” such
as power meters must be upgraded or replaced to enable giving feedback and two-way communication.
Instead of older power meters that may have to be read manually at regular intervals smart meters can
instead be used that automatically report usage statistics and communicate with other components of the
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Figure 2.1: High-level view of smart grid.
power grid and home. The point of this is that all the components of the grid will be able to independently
report their status to central systems. Previously there might have been a need for sending out workers to
check the status of a device. If all components of the grid continuously report their status it is possible to
use this information for a number of purposes such as locating faults, load balancing and in general a better
overview and management of the system.
Another important functionality in the smart grid is control. To enable control there needs to be actua-
tors and switches that can be triggered by remote commands to re-route power or change the configuration
of the grid. In cases where power needs to be transmitted from one area to another or if there are power
fluctuations that need to be dealt with these control systems makes that significantly easier. There also
needs to be a way for smart meters to receive commands from the grid that actually affect devices in the
home. Traditional meters may only transmit their metering information or even require manual readings
that must be submitted by the customer. However in the smart grid meters must allow for two-way com-
munication that allows the grid to intelligently manage not only the large components of a power system
but also smaller ones down to house or even appliance levels. This can for instance allow load balancing
by turning off or rescheduling certain devices from operating in a customer’s home.
The benefits that the operator gains are load-balancing, locating of faults, easier billing and mainte-
nance. Having a more complete picture of the status of the network including continuous information on
the usage of individual homes and areas can simplify the provisioning of power to different areas. Getting
instant updates in the case that there is a loss of power to one section of the network also helps with quickly
resolving this issue. Especially identifying the location and extent of the power outage can be made easier
in the smart grid because detailed information is available as to exactly which homes and devices are af-
fected by the outage. As for maintenance identifying the exact location of the problem even down to the
component that needs replacement makes it easier to send out maintenance teams to the correct location
and with the right equipment. In fact sometimes it may be possible to do remote maintenance by triggering
a switch or controlling the power grid with remote commands. As for load-balancing customer devices can
be controlled and usage can be scheduled to be more evenly spaced thereby having more uniform power
drain over the course of a day.
The smart grid gives benefits not only for the operator of the network. The customer can benefit in
many ways. One way is for the power grid to inform the smart meter in a home when the price of power
is low. In this way the customer can use power only when it is cheaper or at least have that information
and choice available. Other benefits are that if the customer is operating a power-generating device such as
small wind turbine or solar panel this energy can be easily measured and sold back to the grid or deducted
from the customer’s power usage. Customers can also get a nice overview of their power usage and habits
to simplify reducing it. If the information captured by the smart meters is also presented in a convenient
way to the customer, for instance through a web site, graphs and other statistical information can make it
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easier to understand what in the house and when the most power is used.
Instead of local solutions and systems that have a limited view and control a smart grid can create
a comprehensive picture. The different parts of the power grid can be coordinated with each other and
information about what other devices in the grid are doing is available. In this way a control system can
have control and sufficient statistics to control very large grids even to a national scale. Also more advanced
functionality that relies on two-way communication is possible. One example is having local devices or
customers inquire and adapt their behaviour according to the current power available in the network. This
can for instance be done with price incentives so that customers can schedule power consuming activities
when the price of power is currently low. This can be a win-win scenario since the customers save money
and the operator of the power grid has less risk of having a situation where there is a power shortage in the
network or having to import expensive power from other sources to cover peak demands. Of course to what
extent the provider can influence and control devices in the home of consumers is an important question
with privacy implications.
Given the massive and pervasive presence of ICT security is an important factor in the smart grid. The
reason for this is that now that more components include intelligent systems and microprocessors they
are also susceptible to attack. Because these devices will be running software and listen for commands
that they then execute the attack surface compared to traditional systems is increased. Another factor is
of course that every time connection to a network is made that opens a direct communications channel
into the device that can be exploited. This is especially true when any of the systems are connected to the
Internet. Not only the devices but also the communication channels between them can be attacked. For
instance wireless communication can be sniffed and even cables can be tapped. In this way an attacker
can potentially gain access to statistical and control information on the power grid. The information found
from eavesdropping can also be used to launch an attack against devices in the system.
The security aspects mentioned above mean that the smart grid as any other network connected system
with devices running software and executing commands is vulnerable to attack. That fact alone means that
a security solution is needed. Even more because a smart grid is a particular kind of network because it
manages critical infrastructure of a country. Because of that, it is also a tempting target for attacks. By
attacking the grid minor benefits such as a customer manipulation the power usage to reduce costs can be
achieved. Bigger issues are attacks that try to disrupt the power grid for destructive purposes. For instance,
countries can attack each other in this manner, other crimes can be simplified if the power to an area is cut,
and someone may do this in order to cause the maximum amount of damage. Hence any smart grid needs
a strong and comprehensive security architecture. Of course technologies used in the normal Internet can
be used in addition to standard security best practices. But smart grids frequently employ custom or niche
protocols that may lack built-in security solutions. There are also some special considerations specific to
the smart grid like guaranteeing low latency for control channels that can have an impact on the solutions
chosen.
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3. Platform security for Smart Meters
Platform security relates to how security can be maintained in a specific system. Ensuring security is a
complex problem and needs to be dealt not only from one point of view, but considering the whole system
and even the environment in which it operates. Both the software running on the smart meter and also the
hardware of the meter itself must ensure that operations are securely performed. To this end it is important
to not implicitly trust any part of the system. For instance software being loaded on the meter can be
compromised and the hardware of the meter tampered with. Hence it is necessary to verify and guarantee
that any software that runs on the meter is properly authorized to do so. As to hardware it is necessary
to ensure that the hardware provides sufficient security services and that there are checks to confirm the
integrity of the hardware itself.
3.1 Software solutions
The main goal of software platform security is to make sure that the software running on a device has the
permission to do so. For instance, an attacker can try to load custom software on a smart meter either by
hijacking the update system or by going through an access port of the meter. Being able to run arbitrary
code allows an attacker to manipulate a device and take control of it. This can include altering sensor read-
ings, and sending fake commands to the other devices in the network or the equipment in the user’s home.
There are also potential attacks that exploit the compromised device as a server or a tool for attacking other
systems. One common way of checking that code should be allowed to run on a device is by cryptograph-
ically signing it. Practically, the system should not trust incoming software, verifying its integrity before
installation and execution, until it can verify that it is actually legitimate.
The survey paper [35] on smart meter security raises the question of who should actually own the smart
meters deployed in people’s homes. One issue is how to enable the smart meter to control different devices
in the home. For instance, when new devices such as home appliances are released the meters may need to
be updated with new software to enable control functionalities and support for them. This is also a potential
security problem as a smart meter may need to implicitly trust various software from manufacturers to
interact with their devices. In addition, meters from different manufacturers may be required to interact
with each other.
The paper suggests to use a standardized architecture based on open source software. In particular, it
refers to the OHC (Open Home Controller) model developed by the Apache foundation. The OHC works
as a gateway interfacing with the devices in the home, the energy meters and the provider’s devices in the
energy grid. In particular the OHC should be a software package to be deployed on any class of device
like a meter, gateway or even a router. The OHC would work as an open system that manufacturers can
adapt or extend to contribute functionalities needed to interface different equipment with each other. The
power companies and resellers can also have an open system and use the OHC as a base to implement any
functionality they need. They will also have the benefit of sharing the workload for the development of
this system and avoiding fragmentation. If a shared platform like the OHC is used each company is not
forced to re-implement smart metering software separately. Having one standardized system like this can
alleviate many of the interoperability issues, focus security research on one system instead of multiple ones
and finally make it easier for manufacturers to develop drivers for smart meters.
Further techniques for ensuring integrity of a system from a software point of view are mentioned in
[49]. For instance, models such as Biba & LOMAC can decide on levels of trust for different parts of a sys-
tem. That is, Biba organizes software in a hierarchy ensuring that lower level processes cannot modify the
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data owned by higher level processes. The LOMAC model sets the integrity level of a process depending
on the integrity level of the data it is interacting with. As for process integrity the paper recommends using
cryptographic digest or hash functions in addition to developing the software with the latest research in
safe software architecture in mind. It is also important to verify the incoming data from a communication
partner as attacks and other issues can be caused by blindly trusting incoming data. Even data that appears
harmless like power statistics can potentially cause issues not to mention data with actual commands to the
meter.
Data integrity is also covered in [49], as to verifying collected and generated data. Collected data
can be verified by means of semantic checks, through signatures or by checking whether the path the
data has arrived from is secure itself. To evaluate the integrity of incoming data the source should be
cryptographically verified along with the freshness of the data. Generated data is the data generated by a
process, often according to previously collected data. This requires assuring that processes are also secure
and non-compromised. It also depends on the integrity of the process itself as if the process is compromised
the generated data will also be compromised. To this end run-time attestation and verifiable code execution
can be used to protect against run-time vulnerabilities. Ensuring the integrity of a complete system is a
complex task as everything from the BIOS, TPM, kernel and processor needs to be integrity checked. They
all depend on each other and a flaw at any level can potentially compromise other components.
Having background processes that periodically verify the running software on a device is also beneficial
[49]. This can also be coupled with hardware checks to ensure that a device running unverified code
will not be able to create security associations with other parties. Furthermore, there is a relevant danger
of running unsigned code such as Java, JavaScript, PDF and Flash documents in any environment that
should be secure. A recent report by the security testing site AV-test shows that Adobe Reader, Flash
and Java together made up 66% of vulnerabilities exploited by malware on Windows systems [21]. Many
vulnerabilities are created through the use of similar third party software. For this reason, strict code signing
standards should be followed to ensure that only code that has been validated can be executed. The security
standards deployed should be across all levels of the network including switches, routers, field deployed
units, control center equipment and servers. It is not uncommon for an attacker to target the weakest part
of a system to gain a foothold from which to attempt further attacks.
With particular reference to embedded systems, two things are most important. First the manufacturer
should follow standards for secure software development such as the ones recommended by CERT [43].
In addition, secure update procedures must be provided. One common way to accomplish this consists of
embedding a cryptographic key in a secure storage module added during the manufacturing of the device.
The hardware can be provided with the public key of a signing authority, possible under the control of the
device distributor, and any download software can then be verified using this key. Approaches that check
the validity of the software in such fashion, such as a kind of white-list, will make it possible to install and
execute only correctly signed applications. Conversely, virus checkers trying to identify and analyze if a
piece of software is malicious could potentially not be as effective.
3.2 Hardware solutions
Hardware security deals with ensuring that the hardware that a device is using is trusted. Practical solu-
tions to achieve this rely on solutions such as cryptoprocessors and secure storage for cryptographic keys.
Specifically it is crucial that, if pre-shared keys are used, an attacker cannot simply connect to the meter
and retrieve the keys. Furthermore, any device attempting to interact with the smart meters has to be au-
thorized. This is especially important if there are maintenance ports that can be used by technicians for
service but potentially also by an attacker. Ensuring hardware security can be a difficult problem, but there
are existing solutions to draw inspiration from, such as smart cards that can securely store keys without
the possibility to extract them [SCARD]. Another method is using signatures to validate the hardware used
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and to periodically check its integrity.
One key feature of smart meters is the used software and hardware platforms. Usually, different compa-
nies employ different custom solutions with little reference to standards use. General purpose components
such as CPUs and RAM are assembled to create essentially a computer where the smart metering software
is deployed. Relying on many custom solutions can lead to security flaws because of untested components
or untested combinations of components. Also, in the presence of custom hardware solutions, software
may have to be custom built for the specific hardware. This which limits flexibility and the possibility for
deploying the same control software on different meters. Another potential problem is that manufacturers
may have to write drivers for many different variations of hardware.
That being said, a number of specific hardware requirements for smart meters have been defined [25],
such as
• Support for cryptography - Enable common cryptographic operations with hardware acceleration.
• Secure key handling - Secure storeage of keys.
• Random number generators - Give random numbers to use in cryptographic operations.
• Secure clock - Correct time information.
• Trusted execution - Ensure integrity of running software.
• Tamper detection - Detect attempts to manipulate hardware or data.
• Secure debug - Provide control and only allow authorized debugging.
Hardware support for cryptography is particularly important, since cryptographic operations are usually
more expensive and resource consuming when performed in software. In particular, software implemen-
tations may be too slow or expensive (in terms of energy) compared to the same operation performed via
hardware. Secure key handling is another important requirement as the security of smart meters typically
use cryptographic keys as a core element. Typically, a master key is used to generate other session or tem-
porary keys for the day to day operations. This means that if the master key is compromised, the whole key
material of the meter is compromised. Note that the keys must not only be protected from outside attackers
but also from the final user himself, who has physical access to the meter. By reading the content of the
RAM or simply files stored on the meter, keys and other important data can be retrieved. To prevent this,
the CPU or other hardware components can provide special functionalities that securely store and protect
keys and make them impossible to compromise. A possible solution relies on smart cards, that contain
and protect the keys but allow interacting with them through a set of operations [37]. These can include
public-key cryptography functionality such as authentication and signing using the keys securely stored on
the card.
Furthermore many applications and communications protocols rely on random numbers or timestamps.
If the clock of a smart meter is incorrectly set, operations may fail or become exposed to replay attacks.
Also, some protocols require synchronization between different entities in their operation and may only
accept packets within a specific time window. Hence, having a reliable and correct clock is particularly
important. Random numbers are also crucial for many ciphers and security procedures. If random numbers
could be predicted, freshness of procedures and information gets compromised and potential attacks can
be made easier. Some attacks also try to deduce the output of random number generators by measuring
time and currents in the hardware [30]. It follows that the adopted random number generator should be
secure and tested to ensure random output. That is, an attacker practically perceives generated numbers as
random. Secure pseudo-random number generators are implemented through ciphers.
10
Trusted execution is an umbrella term for a system that ensures the integrity of the software running
on it from the hardware up to the software [16]. In essence, this allows the system to confirm that the
operating system running on it has not been modified and is working correctly. Also any software running
on the device should be signed with a correct key to ensure that it is authorized to run. This is a particularly
important for smart meters, since it could be otherwise possible to load custom software, and then reporting
only a subset of the occurring events, such as 9/10 of the actual power usage. Securing the hardware is also
important as physical access to a device is among the most difficult aspect to protect. Since the meter is
in the home, the user will have physical access and opportunity to manipulate it. By replacing or reading
data from the hardware components, the the meter’s operations can be compromised. Hence the meter
needs to ensure that it is operating correctly without unauthorized modification. This is also related to
enable secure updates of the meter, i.e. an incoming update can be signed and confirmed to be released and
distributed by an authorized source. Tamper detection is also normally included in the functionality that
trusted execution provides. In particular, physical anti-tampering measures such as custom screws or seals
can also be employed to discourage and detect tampering attempts.
Secure debugging means controlling the rights to perform debugging of processes and only providing
authorized users with this privilege. While debugging a process, its control flow and operation can be
altered, because of this debugging itself can be a security risk as possible vulnerabilities in the process
could be exploited or the system manipulated. The rights to debug need to be specified and the debugging
entity authorized. For instance if there is a USB port for legitimate debugging or update purposes from
the manufacturer/distributor of the smart meter, it needs to be sufficiently protected such that an attacker
cannot connect to it and gain unauthorized access. Besides, the device connecting to the debug port needs
to be authenticated [7]. This scheme can also be fine grained and allow different levels of debug access
for different entities. For instance reading some statistics and usage data can be less strictly controlled
compared to performing software update or maintenance.
One suggested solution consists of verifying system integrity by employing a local source like a smart
card and/or a remote source like an authentication server [22]. A TPM module can also provide benefits
in ensuring system integrity as it described by international standards for secure cryptography functions
in processors [42]. In fact, it provides most of the functionalities mentioned in the list above, such as an
RNG, key generator, hash generator and secure memory used to store encryption keys. The typical com-
ponents of a TPM module are depicted in Figure 3.1. Furthermore it is also possible to rely on physical
sensors to detect tampering. Finally, it is particularly difficult to detect malevolent software modifications
occurring at runtime. Of course, if a remote server is used for authentication, it should be ensured that an
attacker cannot impersonate this server by deploying other solutions such as communication encryption.
Furthermore, in the case smart cards are used, it should be ensured that they cannot be replaced with cards
containing the attacker’s own keys. Attacking the key components used for security and authentication by
impersonating, blocking or manipulating them can often be a powerful attack. So any source of authen-
tication or key storage like key management servers and smart cards must be secured, authenticated and
difficult to impersonate.
As suggested in [49] a secure platform such as a smart meter should verify its neighbours and com-
munication partners by checking that they have a TPM, root of trust, secure kernel, isolated execution
environment, protected storage and shielded communication channels. By checking that remote systems
conform to this, a TCG (trusted computing group) can be formed where the devices have ensured the in-
tegrity of each other. Furthermore, [49] stresses that a smart grid architecture requires a comprehensive
security system covering all aspects of the smart grid operation and trusted computing is only a part of
this model, together with secure kernel and application layer. Two type of systems needs to be considered,
embedded systems that should only run the software of the manufacturer and general purpose systems
where the customer decides what to run. The former has the benefit that security and access to the device is
more strictly controlled but at the same time such a solution can be less flexible when it comes to allowing
extensions and adding functionalities.
Of course these functionalities can also be implemented in software. However, hardware implementa-
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Figure 3.1: Typical components of TPM. [10]
tions are beneficial as the hardware itself can guarantee some functionality and security that software cannot
always reach in terms of reliability. On the other hand hardware with specific advanced functionalities can
be more expensive to acquire. Also hardware solutions are less flexible, i.e. software solutions can easily be
replaced and upgraded while the hardware is less easily upgradeable. There needs to be a trade-off between
price and which hardware functionality is absolutely needed. Multiple aspects like effectiveness, flexibility
and price need to be considered when selecting a solution. Furthermore, some government departments set
specific hardware requirements for the equipment used in smart meter, for instance the German BSI has
issued a policy detailing exactly what a smart meter must provide [11]. Such requirements often stem from
the fact that weak security in the smart meters and power grid of a country can be a national security risk.
3.3 Virtualization techniques
Virtualization is a technology that enables a device to be artificially split into virtual machines or be com-
posed of virtual hardware on top of the physical hardware running the system. In this way, it is possible
to logically separate processes or data in the same way as they are physically separated in hardware. A
similar example is how a Ethernet switch can be separated into several by employing VLAN technology.
Of course, the separation is not as strong as when implemented in hardware but if the virtualization soft-
ware is correctly designed, it should prevent the same attacks and issues. So, a part of a hard drive can
be designated as read-only only memory, or be set with policies that only enable processes with a specific
privilege level to read from this part. Thus a part of a hard drive can be used to store sensitive data that
only some processes are supposed to access. Furthermore it can be beneficial to separate the operating
system and core functionality from any other process running. Then, even if a user process crashes or
tries to manipulate the core system, the operating system will not be affected. This can also be combined
with a technique called VMI [40] that allows for inspection of running virtual machines. VMI allows for
monitoring the integrity of a virtual machine and stopping it instantly if any problems are detected.
There are certain important functionalities that it are desirable for the hardware to support, in order to
create a secure environment. With new advances in virtualization and hypervisor technology it is often
possible to implement this hardware-functionality in software with a similar level of security. As a conse-
quence, special purpose-chips are no longer required and cheaper processors can be used when assembling
the smart meters. Of course this means reduced cost when producing the meters, and other possible benefits
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like faster manufacturing and lower power consumption. There can be a demand for smart meters to sup-
port not only functionalities that come from the manufacturer but also third party tools that can even enable
other functionalities. For this reason, having a system where the core functionality of the manufacturer can
be protected from any other third part processes running on the devices is beneficial and often desirable.
Even though virtualization is used attacks have been shown that enable an application to ”escape” from the
VM and execute code on the host system [19]. In addition to that new developments in virtualization or
hypervisor technology can enable implementing some of the mentioned functionality securely in software
just as can be done in hardware.
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4. Security Life-cycle management
One key factor in any security system is the cryptographic key material used for encryption and other
services such as assuring authentication. In fact, no matter how strong any particular cipher or security
scheme, in the end the security provided hinges on a correct usage and management of the key material.
For instance, two devices communicating with each other can share the same key if symmetric encryption
is used, or otherwise be aware of each other’s public key, or at least be able to retrieve it in a secure way.
No matter which solution is chosen, some initial secret information is required. In the case of symmetric
encryption, this consists in pre-shared encryption keys or data to generate them. In case of public-key
encryption the public keys of other devices plus possibly locations where further keys can be retrieved are
necessary needed.
Another aspect is what happens and how the keys are managed after deployment of devices. It may
be necessary to update keys if some changes occur in the system, for instance on a regular basis. If a
key is compromised by an attacker it should not be possible to decrypt old previously captured traffic.
GPG, which is a well known system for data encryption, sets an expiration data on keys it uses to limit
any potential damage if the key is exposed. Keys may also have to be revoked when a device has been
compromised, or suspected to be so. This can be especially difficult when considering a group of devices
that share key information, such as a common group key, and sensitive data. How to securely and efficiently
exclude one member of the group is an interesting problem with different proposed solutions. This chapter
considers the problems of initial distribution of key material, that is imprinting, and management of key
material.
4.1 Imprinting
When a new device is commissioned, it necessary that some initial data are provided. For instance, this
can be a piece of information meant as a seed used to generate keys in a predictable way. Typically a given
device needs something unique connected to its identity. This information can be used to identify itself and
securely authenticate to other services. Of course, this makes the key material and initial provisioning of
such a crucial part of the security infrastructure. If such keys are suspected to be compromised, the affected
devices have to be considered untrusted and must be provided with new keys in a secure way.
Providing this initial information to a device is known as imprinting and can be performed by the
manufacturer or independently be the operator and final owner of the device. Part of such initial information
can be shared with other entities in the operator network, e.g. in order to allow secure communication.
This initial information has to be accessible to the operator also. There has to be a binding between the
device (such as the serial number) and the initial information assigned to a device. In this way the initial
information is tied to a specific device, and its identity can be verified along with being able to use resulting
key material for secure communication with this particular device. The manufacturer also has to be trusted
to provide the key information placed in each device and to have strict security standards so that this
information is not leaked to unauthorized entities. Thus, the manufacturing procedure has to be monitored
or secured in such a way that sensitive material is encrypted or otherwise protected.
Once this initial security material has been shared, whether it is actual keys or information to generate
them, it can be used to create further permanent keys or temporary session keys. When using cryptographic
keys for securing communication analysis of the data exchanged or other attacks could lead to keys being
exposed. Ensuring that exposed key material does not enable calculating other session keys used is impor-
tant and known as forward secrecy. Also, using a key for too long makes it easier for an attacker to perform
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such an analysis. Therefore it is good to periodically renew keys, and use temporary session keys for spe-
cific information-exchanges. Note that specific criteria for periodical key renewal are strictly dependent
of application requirements and constraints. If a key is found to be compromised it must be revoked and
not possible to use in the future. Establishing group keys for communication between groups of devices is
another possibility. Having an initial piece of pre-shared data enables sharing and establishing other keys
or information needed for later communication in the network. The initial piece of information is needed
to enable and get this process started.
As mentioned above different material can be used to generate keys. For instance this can be a serial
number uniquely associated to the device. Then such initial information can be used to generate the actual
key material, for instance through key-hashing functions [15]. Since the device and the key management
service agree on the initial key material and security primitives, both of them can independently calculate
the same keys. In this way, it could be avoided to expose the actual keys during manufacturing or at any
other stage of the deployment process. It can also complicate attacks attempting to retrieve keys from
devices’ memory, since keys can be stored in RAM rather than in long term storage memory.
4.2 Key management and (re)distribution
Although imprinting and providing devices with initial key material is important, it is only the first step.
That is most of a device’s lifetime will be after manufacturing and deployment. This means that manage-
ment of key material has to continue throughout the life-cycle of the device. Also, after deployment further
keys may need to be generated or transmitted, the preliminary keys could be replaced or key information
can be removed entirely because a device has been compromised. The idea is that compromised keys
must be quickly revoked, and possibly renewed. There can also be cases when a device with valid keys is
compromised and used by an attacker. In this case when a device gets compromised, and hence also the
key material it contains, it is be important to quickly isolate and communicate to the other devices in the
network that the specific key of the compromised device should no longer be accepted.
Of course, key management does not deal only with a particular device as to creating, removing, and
updating keys. Rather, key management has to take the full network into account, so that key information is
consistent and distributed correctly to all the devices. A key management system can consist of individual
end-devices, key storage devices, key distribution centers and possibly certificate authorities. Typically an
entity that is responsible for assigning and managing keys is present, and communicates with end-devices to
refresh or revoke keys from the network. One important thing is being able to quickly revoke any possible
keys when devices are compromised or suspected to be so. This is vital in order to prevent an adversary
from performing a number of attacks, such as inspecting encrypted messages.
In [47], the authors consider some cyber security challenges for the smart grid including key man-
agement. They point out that a normal smart grid may have millions of credentials and mismanagement
can have disastrous consequences. Furthermore they summarize important security requirements when it
comes to key management, that is:
• Secure management - Managing keys in a secure fashion, correct algorithm usage, adequate key
sizes and protection of crypto material.
• Scalability - The wide area systems and smart grid may have a very large number of devices which
puts pressure on the system to be scalable.
• Efficiency - Computational efficiency (processing required for crypto operations), storage (disk space
used for keys and RAM) and communication (overhead of crypto and metadata).
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• Evolvability - Possibility for the system to be easily updated and adapted to future developments. It
should be able to integrate new ciphers and protocols.
A summary of existing key management schemes is also provided, including the usage of a single
shared symmetric key among all devices. If the key is exposed however the fact that it is shared among
all devices means that it can lead to very severe consequences. Because of this the key should be securely
stored and devices should be tamper proof to avoid the possibility for an attacker to expose the key used.
Another option is SKE which was designed by Sandia National Laboratories for use with SCADA systems.
It relies on a hybrid approach, utilizing both symmetric and public-key encryption depending on the com-
munications scenario. One drawback of SKE is that it does not have a complete key management system
nor provides good support for multicast or broadcast secure communication. SKMA is a system that was
built to improve on SKE. A Key Distribution Center (KDC) is used for the generation and distribution of
keys in the system. Using the KDC two keys are created for each device, one for node-to-node communi-
cation and one for communication with the KDC. The node-to-KDC key is installed on the node while the
node-to-node key can be requested from the KDC. This protocol does not support multicast either.
ASKMA is an option for key management on SCADA systems that uses a hierarchy of keys for im-
proved efficiency. It supports multicast communication and is efficient from a computational point of view.
ASKMA+ is a further development of ASKMA that splits keys into classes, each one of which maintains
the hierarchical structure of ASKMA. Compared to ASKMA, it is more efficient in terms of storage and
also better when it comes to multicast communication performance. SMOCK is a proposal for a lightweight
key management system for wireless devices. It has very low communications overhead but is less compu-
tationally efficient and is not fully compatible with multicast communication.
An issue pointed out in [47] is that many of the key management protocols target a specific architecture
such as SCADA. Certainly, the modern smart grid can include SCADA systems, but it is also a collection
of various devices, often under the control of different entities. This adds additional challenges because
the key management protocol has to be dynamic enough and not tied to a particular infrastructure. On
the other hand, not all parts are time sensitive which means that low cost asymmetric encryption could be
utilized. Scalability is also important, because of the size of the smart grid and its diversity. The various
protocols used in the smart grid also come with their own challenges, i.e. some may have strong support
for encryption while others can have less security functionalities built into the protocol. It is recommended
that, apart from conventional PKI-schemes, alternatives like policy-based and attribute-based encryption
may be interesting options to look into for the smart grid.
Support for group key management can be desirable in smart grids, since relying on broadcast/multicast
communication benefits in terms of efficiency. For instance, a large number of meters can be grouped
together to regularly be provided with information or updates. This means that data provisioning through
multicast can be much more efficient compared to unicast communication. A smart grid is also usually
hierarchical where devices are organized in levels and the devices at the top need to send information to the
other ones at the bottom. So having a single or a few sources originating data that is to be sent to the smart
meter at the bottom of the hierarchy is a common occurrence. Because of this, multicast support from key
management protocols is an important and desirable feature.
In addition to the periodical key renewal discussed above, in the case of group communication it is
important to renew a given group key upon the occurrence of the two following events. 1) In case a new
device joins the group, so that it is not able to access any group key used before its joining. This prevents
the device to access old communication within the group, so assuring the backward security requirement.
2) In case one or more devices leave the group, i.e. they ask to leave or have to be evicted because are
compromised or suspected to be so. In particular, the group key must be revoked, and a new one must be
distributed to the remaining group members. This prevents the leaving devices from taking part in future
communication within the group, so assuring the forward security requirement. It is vital to assure that the
leaving devices are not able to participate to the key re-distribution process, and thus cannot get the new
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group key. This can be particularly difficult in case multiple, possibly colluding, group members have to
be evicted at the same time. Finally, a group key management scheme must be highly efficient and scalable
with the group size, in order to limit the impact on system performance, and allow the network to be fully
operative again as soon as possible. The reader can refer to [3][5][12][13][31] for some relevant examples
of available group key management approaches.
4.3 Open problems
One factor mentioned in [47] is that key management support for systems using symmetric keys is lacking.
Many of the key management systems listed in the preceding section use asymmetric or hybrid approaches.
For symmetric keys that can have a benefit in terms of calculating power required there is a need for more
key management solutions. Symmetric keys have to be changed periodically and this means that a key
management system has to provide new keys to the devices in the network. This can also open additional
security vulnerabilities as the keys can be exposed in transit. There also has to be a trust system in place
that can authenticate the device to the provider of new symmetric keys and vice versa. Limiting the data
protected by a symmetric key could be one way to alleviate some of the drawbacks of symmetric key use
and reduce the frequency of which it has to be renewed.
Another issue mentioned in the same paper is how to create a key management system that is highly
scalable. Smart grids frequently have a very high number of devices in the network which means that any
key management system has to be able to deal with the possibility of having to store a large amount of keys
and handle a lot of key management traffic. Smart grids can also be quite diverse so the key management
system must be able to handle a wide variety of devices and technologies used. For instance a lot of the key
management protocols mentioned in the previous section are focused on SCADA but a key management
system for the smart grid must be broader than that. Using public key cryptography as SMOCK does to
improve scalability may not be the best option for the smart grid as it introduces asymmetric encryption
that can be too computationally expensive for low capacity smart meters.
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5. Communication Protocols
A smart metering system is composed of several interacting parts. Together with smart meter devices,
many other components are present and interacting with each other. This allows enriching the whole power
infrastructure’s capabilities, e.g. to perform advanced remote control and data collection. This chapter
covers some elements of smart metering systems, focusing on how its different components communicate
with each other. Figure 5.1 shows some of the elements of a smart grid.
Figure 5.1: Overview of smart grid configuration.
Typical elements in a smart metering system are:
• Home appliances - They are the devices that the a customer uses in his own private home and that can
interact with the smart meter. For instance, they can include lighting systems, household appliances,
heating systems, and automated blinds. They can communicate and cooperate with each other, and
provide statistic information. Also, they can be remotely controlled by the smart meter. In the end,
these devices can react to instructions from the smart meter such as information on when power costs
are low or allow the user to remotely control these devices in the home. For example, they can be
selectively switched off, or set to a convenient consumption schedule.
• Smart meter - These devices are distributed to the end users, and allow for the smart power grid to
gather data and perform management and control operations remotely. In essence, they work as home
gateways to the smart grid. That is on one hand it is connected to private home appliances, which
it can interact for monitoring and other purposes. On the other hand it is connected to the main
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power grid, and can in turn receive monitoring requests and other commands. There are various
configurations where a smart meter can be a standalone device with a dedicated metering function.
As an alternative, the smart meter can integrate network functionalities and additionally act as a
”gateway”. In such a configuration no extra separate gateway device is needed for providing network
connectivity.
• Utility meter - The actual meter that measures the consumption of electricity, gas, water etc. can be
a standalone device or be implemented as several devices that in turn communicates with the smart
meter. These devices may need to be installed in specific areas, and are often provided by the specific
utility company. Hence, they require a communication interface to to transmit their information to
the main smart meter.
• Gateway - It is an optional device that acts as communication gateway with the rest of the smart grid
interfacing with the smart meter in the house. Having tit as a standalone devices can simplify the
configuration in some scenarios and could allow the use of common hardware such as routers to fill
this role. As mentioned the gateway can be integrated with the meter but currently it is common to
deploy it as a separate device.
• Data concentrator - It is located between smart meters and the central infrastructure of the energy
provider. Its main purpose is to collect and aggregate data from the smart meters, and act as a relay
between the central control systems and the individual meters. It is beneficial to have such an inter-
mediate component in order to separate the network into sections. For instance, one data concentrator
can control all smart meters in a specific geographic or administrative area. Data concentrators then
connect to the central systems, lessening the load on them. This is a better option than having every
individual smart meter being connected to the central systems.
• Head-end system - These make up the central control systems for the smart grid. It is connected
to individual data concentrators through which it can collect statistic reports and perform remote
operations. One key functionality is of course gathering statistic information coming from smart
meters, which allows the energy providers to correctly charge the end customers. Remote control of
smart meters and power switching in the power grid are additional functionalities. A central system
can be under the control of one company, that then provides access to market providers. Remote
updates or maintenance commands can be dispatched from central systems to the smart meters.
Alternatively, data concentrators can directly update smart meters.
The following section provides an overview of the communication between the discussed components.
The rest of the chapter presents the most commonly referred communications protocols.
• Communication between smart meters and home appliances - This is required to allow remote control
of home appliances and collect data from them. Also, this allows to lessen the load on the power
systems in case of low power situations, or home appliances to make intelligent decisions on when
to switch on, depending on the current status of the power grid and the current power cost.
• Communication between smart meters and data concentrators - In essence commands and metering
information are conveyed between individual smart meters and data concentrators. This can alleviate
some of the burden on the centrals systems and also allow for collecting statistics and performing
maintenance operations.
• Communication between data concentrators and central head end systems - For this case data con-
centrators relay information to or from the smart meter with the central infrastructure of the energy
provider. The data concentrators are connected to individual smart meters, and the data concentra-
tors themselves then connect to the central head end part of the network. In this way the devices are
structured in a hierarchical system.
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• Other potential communications channels - They include administrative access to smart meters for
technicians, direct communication between smart meters and central head end systems, communica-
tion between smart meters and external gateways or utility meters.
5.1 Smart meters and smart home appliances
Communication between a smart meter and the associated home appliances differ in many ways between
communication from the meter to the outside world. This is due to the fact that the bandwidth required
for sending simple commands to devices in the home is generally low and that mobility of appliances is
an important factor to consider. Thus, the protocols used for smart meter to appliance communication rely
on wireless techniques and can be short range protocols that only operate within a certain physical range.
It is preferable that communication protocols are energy efficient, especially in the presence of battery-
powered appliances. Having battery constrained appliances need not be a problem as the bandwidth needed
can be quite low and using short range communication can often save battery power in devices. As some
appliances can be power constrained these can prove to be advantageous. There is a wide range of protocols
used for in house communication. Some are explicitly intended for low power networks, while others are
more common technologies such as IEEE 802.11 (WiFi). Also some of these protocols have wider usage
or were originally made for different purposes while some have been specifically designed with smart grids
in mind.
In the following section, an overview of this class of communication protocols is provided.
DPWS (Devices Profile for Web Services)
DPWS is a set of standards including WSDL, SOAP and XML [27] and it is an OASIS standards since
2009. Its purpose is to provide web services in a secure way, with focus on constrained devices. The four
main goals stated in the specification for DPWs are; sending secure messages to and from a service, being
able to dynamically discover a web service, creating a description of a web service, and finally subscribing
to events from a service. DPWS defines a minimum set of requirements to achieve these functionalities.
It uses SOAP over UDP to perform message delivery and relies on a protocol called WS discovery that
enables discovering existing web services on a network [28]. WS discovery can use multicast to listen for
available services on a network. Whenever a device running a service joins the network, it will announce
its presence to a specific multicast group.
6LoWPAN
This is a protocol which focuses on providing networking functionality in sensor networks. As ZigBee,
it also operates on top of 802.15.4. Benefits of 6LoWPAN are a reduced memory overhead and the IPv6
header compression to reduce the communication overhead. In general 6LoWPAN is particularly useful in
networks of resource constrained devices. Also, the support for IPv6 allows devices to be accessible from
anywhere on the Internet through its own IP-address. This in turn allows devices to be independent and
not have to rely on a gateway or communications proxy. For instance, ZigBee nodes require an interme-
diate gateway device and cannot be directly reached from outside the local network through their personal
addresses.
KNX
KNX was created by a consortia of three companies working in the area of home control, namely Batibus,
EIB and EHS. KNX is also defined as an ISO standard in ISO/IEC 14543-3-x [48]. It is intended mainly for
communication within intelligent buildings, and it relies on another standard for managing electrical device,
European Installation Bus (EIB). Also, it supports a wide array of communication media such as copper
cable, radio and infrared communication [18]. KNX can support both multicast and unicast configuration,
making possible group communication and control. The KNX specification is not freely available, but has
to be purchased through the KNX association. KNX is frequently deployed together with sensors to create
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a control system that can monitor a building for alerts from fire, burglary or other malfunctions. There are
several examples of deployments with management interfaces in Sweden utilizing KNX [17].
ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4
ZigBee operates wirelessly on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [6]. In turn IEEE 802.15.4 specifies rules
and the physical layer for personal area networks, considering communication ranges of approximately
10 meters. Communication is in the unlicensed 2.4 GhZ spectrum and thus does not conflict with any
regulation issues. The ZigBee SMart Energy Profile defines specific functionalities and messages as a
protocol for monitoring energy and water systems. ZigBee Smart Energy V2.0 adds support for electric
vehicles and such upgrades that further integration with smart homes [50]. ZigBee is a quite lightweight
and cheap system and can be cheaper to deploy compared to WiFi and Bluetooth. Although the one-hop
physical transmission range is limited, longer distance transmissions can be accomplished by means of
multi-hop and mesh network topologies.
IEEE 802.11/WiFi
One option is to simply use the common IEEE 802.11 protocol commonly referred to as WiFi. It is
a well consolidated technology with wide hardware and software support. Employing WiFi means that
individual appliances require a WiFi card and connect to a home wireless network. Devices like smart
phones, pads, TVs, and even some household appliances like refrigerators already come with WiFi. In this
way less intermediate technologies are needed between the devices and the existing home network or even
the Internet itself. Every device can have a public IPv6 address where it is accessible, this is in contrast
to ZigBee for example which uses its own addressing and needs translation to reach IP-devices on the
Internet. A drawback is that relying on WiFi can be costly from a manufacturing standpoint and energy
requirement point-of-view. If all devices down to the level of light bulbs must implement a WiFi-circuit it
raises the cost of manufacturing. Interference may also be an issue if a large number of wireless nodes are
considered. Since the transmission range of WiFi is wider compared to Bluetooth or ZigBee, interference
with other neighboring users may also be a problem. From a security perspective WPA2 provides strong
security in terms of encryption and integrity protection. Of course, this results in additional communication
overhead and energy consumption.
BACnet
BACnet is another protocol to enable devices in a building to communicate with each other. It defines
objects and services that can be utilized for this purpose. For instance, there are discovery services that
enables finding other BACnet devices, and a large number of objects that can be used to retrieve informa-
tion from a device. If these standardized objects are implemented other entities can use these objects to
read information from a device. In this regard, BACnet is similar to SNMP [24] where there is an attempt
to standardize what information a device should provide and how. For lower layers, BACnet supports a
number of technologies such as Ethernet, LonTalk and point-to-point links [26]. An open source imple-
mentation of BACnet is available for download [39] and BACnet is an ISO standard. BACnet also includes
optional network security that can provide encryption and authenticity of traffic by means of symmetric
cryptographic keys. Keys are always distributed as pairs, i.e. one encryption and one signing key. In total,
there are 6 kinds of these pairs used for different purposes. Messages can be signed with an HMAC based
on MD5 or SHA256, while optional encryption is performed with AES.
LonTalk
LonTalk is a protocol developed by Echelon and is available as a standard under ISO/IEC 14908. It is
part of a more comprehensive system named LonWorks, that is a software/hardware platform to develop
control systems. It can be used for building automation with regards to energy, heating and air conditioning.
Methods exist to make LonWorks-based systems interoperable with BACnet, Modbus and KNX [36]. They
also provide support for integrating LonWorks-based networks with conventional IP-networks. LonWorks
is quite diverse and used in a wide variety of applications. For instance the some subways systems use




Bluetooth is a short range communications standard for Personal Area Networks (PAN) [1]. It uses the
same frequency bands as WiFi but with lower transmission power and shorter communication range. While
WiFi considers a centralized Access Point (AP) that provides access to the network. Bluetooth relies on a
distributed approach where devices connect directly to each other. Bluetooth is designed to reduce config-
uration efforts and to be fast to set up and operate. From a security point of view historically Bluetooth has
had a number of vulnerabilities [20]. However later updates to the protocol such as Bluetooth v2.1 provides
improvements when it comes to security such as requiring encryption for communication between devices.
For security services it uses the SAFER+ cipher which was one of the candidates submitted for becoming
AES.
5.2 Smart meters and data concentrators
Some protocols rely on dedicated channels only for transmission of control data. However others reuse
the existing electrical system allowing communications data to be sent over the power lines. This can
have the advantage of reusing existing infrastructure, but displays a limited bandwidth for communication.
Of course robustness is also lessened, since if power lines have any issue, the control traffic will also
be affected. On the other hand an existing Internet connection is very frequently available so making it
possible to rely on other more efficient communication protocols. In such a case, there is also less need
for intermediate devices that translate between different protocols. The rest of this chapter overviews some
common protocols for communication between data concentrators and smart meters.
DLMS/COSEM
DLMS (Device Language Message Specification) is a general application layer protocol for defining re-
sources and access methods [8]. COSEM (Companion Specification for Energy Metering) is the energy
meter specific addition that specifies common objects related to smart meters. COSEM attributes describe
objects and can be manipulated with specific interfaces. DLMS/COSEM is attempting to be a general stan-
dard not only for electricity metering but also for heat, gas and water management. The protocol is based
on a client/server architecture where the collection systems pull information from the smart meters. Also, it
supports different underlying communication methods through ”profiles”. Profiles enable DLMS/COSEM
communication as an added layer and is used with different options depending on the underlying technol-
ogy [9].
SML
RWE, EON and EnBW have jointly developed the SML protocol as a part of the SYM2 project [46].
SML was designed by German companies is currently mostly used in Germany. It can be used on top of
TCP/UDP and its application layer defines a structure for sharing data between the measurement point and
collection center. The structure defined in the protocol is usable both with packet-oriented networks and
communication over GSM [23].
IEC 61334-5 PLC
This protocol relies on existing power lines for communication [29]. While they are conveying AC current
they can at the same time carry a limited amount of information. In principle, they add a signal to the
carrier that has been modulated [4]. This carrier signal is then used to encode the data to be transmitted.
This protocol is a part of the IEC 61334 standard for power line communication. The actual throughput
of this protocols is relatively limited due to the few bits of information sent in each power line cycle. The
length of a cycle depends on the utility frequency which is 50 Hz in Europe giving a cycle length of 1/50
seconds. In general upper level protocols such as DLSM/COSEM can be deployed on top of IEC 61334-5
PLC. Also, using OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing) techniques can boost the amount
of throughput it provides, potentially giving near broadband level performance [4].
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SITRED
The SITRED protocol is also based on PLC, and was first developed in Italy in the 90s [2]. It works in
a similar manner to IEC 61334-5 PLC and supports both the SITRED and the LonTalk protocols. This
enables some interoperability between LonTalk and SITRED systems. The data rate is quite limited, i.e.
14.4 kbit/s. In 2009 SITRED was released as open source software by its creator Enel to encourage its
adoption [33].
PRIME (Powerline Related Intelligent Metering Evolution) PLC
This protocol also relies on power lines. It provides a maximum data rate of 130 kpbs, and there are
compatibility layers that provide functionality for both IPv4 and IPv6 [32]. Thus, TPC/IP traffic can be sent
on top of PRIME PLC. However, PRIME cannot coexist well with IEC 61334-5 PLC in the same network.
Currently, the PRIME alliance states that over 5 million meters using this protocol have been deployed.
PRIME PLC version 1.4 was released as late as October of 2014, there is a quite active development
process ongoing. PRIME is an open standard.
5.3 Data concentrators and central head-end systems
Data concentrators are responsible for aggregating and relaying data collected from the smart meters. This
aggregated data and statistics are then transmitted to the head-end system for further processing. Further-
more data concentrators can relay commands from the head-end systems to the smart meters. For instance,
the head-end systems can send a command to a number of concentrators, which in turn forwards the com-
mand to the meters they are connected to. So doing the load can be lessened on the head-end systems,
avoiding continuous end-to-end communication with the smart meters in the system. Concentrators can
also be used to provide large amounts of data such as software updates to the meters. Since data concen-
trators are supposed to be provided with adequate communication and energy resources, they can rely on
traditional Internet connections or mobile links over GSM/GPRS to interact with the head-end-system. The
data amounts being transmitted here are larger compared to the ones between the meter and concentrator
because the concentrator has to report data from a large number of meters. This also sets a requirement on
the type of connection provided to assure sufficient bandwidth.
Internet
One way to connect the data concentrators to the head-end systems is directly through the Internet. In
many cases an Internet connection available in the areas and neighborhoods where data concentrators are
located. Compared to PLC solutions, this allows achieving higher data rates and to be independent from
the power lines. Another benefit is that security protocols such as TLS, IPSec can be utilized to secure
communication. These standards are well consolidated widely adopted and utilizing them can be better
than any custom less adopted solution. However, there can be a potential risk of eavesdropping if the traffic
is routed through systems that the operator does not have control over. Smart grids and their components
can be an attractive target for attackers, and components directly connected to the Internet are also exposed
to automated scans for vulnerabilities, worms, and DoS attacks.
GSM/GPRS
If an Internet connection is not available, the cellular network can be used for communication. This can be
useful in case of more remote areas where Internet connectivity is not available. The cell phone network
typically extends to areas that are remote and only lightly populated, or not even populated at all. GPRS
can reach data rates of around 150 kbit/s [14] which is lower than broadband Internet connections but faster
than other solutions such as PLC. It may also be possible to improve performance by considering 3G or 4G
mobile communications.
DLMS/COSEM
DLMS/COSEM can also be used for interfacing the data concentrator and head-end system.
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6. Secure Communication
As any network connected device, smart meters are vulnerable to a number of attacks. Any time a device
interacts with others, and especially when it receives commands and instructions from other devices, secu-
rity risks arise. Thus, it is crucial for smart meters to verify any incoming commands. In addition, there
is also the risk that the attacker and end user coincide which makes securing the system even more com-
plicated. The devices in the network should not generally assume that each other are trusted. In particular,
smart meters should verify that incoming messages are sent by an authorized entity in the network. Sim-
ilarly other devices in the energy provider’s network should verify the identity of smart meters to ensure
that no impersonation attack or transmission of fake data occurs.
6.1 Threats
Smart meters are in essence vulnerable to a number of attacks against general purpose devices. A smart
meter is a computing device which can use the same communication protocols as many other devices for
communication. In such cases the overlap between attacks against a general Internet-connected device and
a smart meter is quite large. According to [22], some common attacks against smart metering are:
• Message eavesdropping - Monitoring traffic and exchanged messages.
• Denial of Service (DoS) - Flooding device with messages.
• Metering report forgery - Creating false metering data.
• Injection of fake messages - Creating false command data.
• Compromising meter integrity - Attacks against the meter itself.
Some attacks have purely destructive purposes, some can be performed for the financial benefit of the
end user and others aimed at and penetrating deeper into the infrastructure of the smart grid. Message
eavesdropping consists in listening to the traffic sent to and from smart meters. In cases when wireless
communication is used, this is particularly easy as communication can be intercepted by anyone in trans-
mission range. Even when wired systems are used, it is possible to connect into the cable and monitor
traffic. Figure 6.1 shows a fiber optic tap that can be used to eavesdrop an active link. This kind of attack
can be simply performed by curious neighbours or possible thieves interested to know the owner is home
and what devices he owns.
Denial of service is another common attack. A denial of service attack consists of overloading a receiver
with messages that it cannot parse fast enough, thereby flooding it with data. This attack can be targeted at
individual smart meters, or more likely, the energy providers’ infrastructure. SYN flooding and SSL/TLS-
handshake attacks are two examples of denial of service attacks. Furthermore, a number of jamming
attacks can be performed, by interfering at the physical layer in the presence of wireless communication. A
denial of service attack can result in seriously disrupting the energy provider infrastructure, which can be
prevented from gathering monitoring information or executing control operations. In such a case, the entire
smart grid can be affected. Also, smart meters can be vulnerable to DoS attacks and may have difficulty
withstanding message flooding from a sufficiently powerful attacker.
Forgery of smart metering reports can consist of manipulating measurements sent by smart meters
or even generating counterfeit messages. Possible motivations include reducing the electricity bill of a
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Figure 6.1: Fiber optic tap. [34]
customer or increase the electricity bill of a specific victim. Practically this can be achieved by intercepting
report messages and then either changing their content or discarding them. The attacker can also be the
customer which means direct access to the smart meter and cabling is available.
Injection of false commands is a an attack where collected messages, containing commands to a smart
meter, can be altered, and new ones can be injected. The impact of this is that an attacker can execute op-
erations and otherwise influence the smart meters. Smart meters provide a range of commands to perform
operations such as controlling home appliances. As a particular case, an adversary can replay old col-
lected messages and induce smart meters to repeatedly perform specific actions. If an attacker for instance
captures a command that tells the meter to shut down certain devices the attacker can replay these.
Note that message forgery and injection becomes even more effective in case an adversary manages
to compromise and take control of a network device. In such a case, as long as they are not detected,
compromised devices can considerably simplify the attacks execution and increase the effect and impact.
The attacker can also send commands from the smart meter to appliances or use the meter as a starting
points for attacks deeper into the building network. A homogeneous network can also make it easier for an
attacker to employ automated scanning tools and reuse attacks methods against many targets.
6.2 Solutions
Several techniques for establishing communication can be adapted or deployed in smart grids. One of
the main solutions recommended in [22] is using encryption for communication between entities in the
network. This would practically solve many of the problems listed in the section on threats. If network
traffic is encrypted, eavesdropping becomes significantly harder. Of course an attacker can still capture the
data being sent but since it is encrypted it will have limited use. There are many current systems available
to implement encryption from TLS to IPsec that could be deployed in smart grid networks. Of course
different devices have different requirements and the encryption used should be adapted to the capabilities
of the device, type of communication (wireless/wired) and layer at security is required. There are systems
that ensure link-layer security between the hops in the network and others that provide end-to-end security
services. Of course it is also possible to deploy a combination of these to have security at multiple layers
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of the communication.
Similarly spoofing attacks and injecting false data in to the system is more difficult since receiver
would require the data to be encrypted with a specific key for it to be accepted. Replay attacks could
still be possible where an encrypted command is captured and retransmitted later to influence the systems.
Because of this encryption should be coupled with authentication and integrity to ensure that the sender is
authorized to execute commands and that the contents of the message has not been manipulated. Systems
such as IPsec and TLS provide this service too however one issue is key distribution and if a central
authority should be used for signing keys as is done with TLS.
Denial of service attacks is a difficult problem since when if traffic is blocked at the receiver resources
will be expended and upstream systems can be overloaded so legitimate traffic is not let through. Because
of this dealing with denial of service attacks is often best done if the traffic can be blocked as close to the
sender as possible. This means involving other systems than the one under attack to cooperate in blocking
the attackers traffic. There are also methods where the receiver can attempt to filter messages or even
stop receiving traffic in cases of attack. However finding an effective counter measures for theses kinds of
attacks remains difficult.
Sandboxing is a potential solution for attacks against smart meter integrity. In essence sandboxing
consists of isolating processes running in the meter from each other. This means that a security issue in
one part of the software on the meter or attacks performed via hardware can be limited. It is especially
important to keep the operating system and core functionality separated from less privileged processes.
This can also help in cases where third party developers need software to run in the smart meters, for
instance to interact with their home appliances. Hardware solutions like TPM and smart cards can also be
utilized to ensure system integrity and verify running code. Intrusion detection systems are really important
in case smart grid devices become physically or logically compromised. They can monitor the system and
try to detect signs of attacks or anomalous behavior. If such behavior is detected automatic actions can be
performed to isolate or repair the affected devices.
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